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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995 Human Rights Watch interviewed women in Tijuana
maquiladoras.' These workers-along with their employers and local Tijuana
officials-revealed a widely-adopted system of requiring prospective female
employees in Mexico to undergo pregnancy testing. Women who were
pregnant were denied employment. Women found to be pregnant soon after
being hired were also discharged.2 Employers such as Zenith Electronics
Corporation and General Motors admitted pregnancy discrimination; however,
they contended that Mexican law "implicitly condoned this practice-by
refusing to extend maternity benefits to women with fewer than 30 weeks
tenure in the social security system--as part of a wider policy initiative to
control population growth.",
3
Zenith and General Motors were operating in Mexico largely under free
trade agreements adopted by the Mexican and American governments. In the
early 1990s, Mexico agreed to both the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA)4 and the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(NAALC).5 The NAALC, a side agreement to NAFTA, arguably falling
"A maquiladora is a Mexican corporation operating under a special customs regime which
allows the corporation to temporarily import duty-free, raw materials, equipment, machinery,
replacement parts, and other items needed for the assembly or manufacture of finished goods for
subsequent export." JORGE A. VARGAS ET AL., MEXICAN LAW: A TREATISE FOR LEGAL
PRACTITIONERS AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS 182-83 (Jorge A. Vargas ed., 1998).
2 See Submission Concerning Pregnancy-Based Sex Discrimination in Mexico's
Maquiladora Sector to the United States National Administrative Office, Submission No. 9701
(U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau ofInt'l Affairs May 15, 1997) (submitted by Human Rights Watch
Women's Rights Project et al.), available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/nao/
submissions/Sub9701.htm [hereinafter NAO Submission No. 9701].
3Id.
" North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
(2003) [hereinafter NAFTA]. The stated goals of NAFTA are to (1) eliminate barriers to
transnational trade between the member nations; (2) promote fair competition within the
jurisdiction of the member nations; (3) increase investment in the territory of member nations;
(4) protect and enforce the intellectual property rights in each nation's territory; (5) make
procedures to implement, jointly apply, and resolve disputes under the Agreement; and (6)
establish a framework for other trilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation to further the
benefits of the Agreement. Id. art. 102.
' North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 13, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 1499 [hereinafter NAALC].
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within the original NAFTA purpose of ensuring fair competition, contains
specific provisions for protecting workers.6 The goals of the NAALC are to:
(a) improve working conditions and living standards in each
Party's territory, (b) promote.., the labor principles set out in
annex C, (c) encourage cooperation to promote innovation and
rising levels of productivity and quality, (d) encourage
publication and exchange of information to enhance
understanding of the laws.., in each Party's territory, (e) pursue
cooperative labor-related activities on the basis of mutual benefit,
(f) promote compliance with, and effective enforcement by each
party of, its labor law, and (g) foster transparency in the
administration of labor law.7
Not falling within these express purposes, the anti-discrimination provisions
form only one part of the larger agreement.
Since becoming a party to NAFTA and the NAALC, Mexico has faced
accusations of failing to adequately prevent employment discrimination and
of failing to protect other labor and employment rights, as exemplified in the
cases of Zenith and General Motors.8 In response to its perceived failure in
addressing employment discrimination, Mexico's Congress passed LeyFederal
para Prevenir y Eliminar la Discriminaci6n (Federal Law to Prevent and
Eliminate Discrimination).9
In comparison to the United States' prohibition on employment
discrimination contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1" the new
6 Id. art. 1.
7Id.
8 The U.S. National Administrative Office lists submissions alleging violations of the
NAALC and its employment discrimination provisions. U.S. Dep't of Labor, U.S. NAO
Submissions, http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/nao/public-submissions.htm (last visited Apr.
18, 2006).
9 Decreto por el que se expide la Ley Federal para Prevenir y Eliminar la Discriminaci6n
[Decree by Which the Federal Law of Prevent and Eliminate Discrimination Is Issue], Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 11 de Junio de 2003 (Mex.) [hereinafter Ley para Prevenir la
Discriminaci6n]. Scholarly articles on pre-act discrimination are abundant, yet should be
distinguished for not discussing the new law or the new law's effect on NAALC performance.
,0 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2003). Title VII prohibits
discrimination in hiring, discharging, or any act with regard to compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, "because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." Id. Separate statutes address other forms of group discrimination: the Age
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Mexican statute has a far greater scope of protection. The Mexican statute
prohibits discrimination based on ethnic or national origin, sex, age, disability,
social or economic condition, health condition, pregnancy, language, religion,
opinion/political persuasion, sexual preference, marital status, xenophobia,
anti-Semitism, or "any other distinction that has the effect of impeding or
annulling the recognition or exercise of rights and equal opportunities.""
Despite the expansive scope of statutory protection, 12 the issue remains
whether enforcement of the law will occur, thereby satisfying Mexico's treaty
obligations under the NAALC. There are a number of potential problems that
could serve to undermine Mexico's efforts. For example, it is unclear whether
appropriate resources are directed for enforcement of the Mexican law.
Furthermore, the law might exceed constitutional limitations, 3 fail to include
a ban on discrimination against groups, 4 and be ineffective against
discrimination at the state and municipal levels. 5 In fact, these potential
flaws-in the aggregate-so undermine Ley Federal para Preveniry Eliminar
la Discriminaci6n as to render enforcement and actualization of the spirit
behind the law potentially meaningless. Consequently, fulfillment of Mexico's
treaty obligations under the NAALC remains tenuous at best.
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1967) [hereinafter ADEA];
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (Oct. 31, 1978)
(amending Title VII § 701(k) to include pregnancy); and Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990) [hereinafter ADA].
Ley para Prevenir la Discriminaci6n art. 4.
'2 Different policy rationales underlie each of the three major U.S. statutes (ADEA, ADA,
and Title VII). Equal protection from all forms of discrimination might make the Mexican
statute suspect to fairness arguments, however that is a matter of discussion for future study.
13 Raymundo Gil Rend6n, Comentarios a la Ley Federal Para Prevenir y Eliminar la
Discriminaci6n [Comments to the Federal Law to Prevent and Eliminate Discrimination],
REVISTA ELECTR6NICA DEL DEPARTAMENTO DE CIENCIA POLiTICA Y DERECHO, Enero-Junio
2004, at 165, http://www.ccm.itesm.mx/dhcs/juripolis/archivos/RaymundoGil.pdf. The author,
Coordinator of the Human Rights Commission for the Mexican Bar Association and President
of El Consejo Nacional para Prevenir la Discriminaci6n (the agency responsible for
administration of the new Mexican law), contends that the law is beyond the scope of Congress's
authority. Id.
" Edgar Cortez Moralez, La Ley Contra la Discriminaci6n, Una Ley de Buenos Deseos?
[The Law Against Discrimination, A Law of Good Intentions?], Centro de Derechos Humanos
"Miguel Agustin Pro Ju6.rez" (June 13, 2003), http://www.sjsocial.org/PRODH/Sala%20de%
20prensa/Posicion/Postura%2Odel%20Centr%2OPrdh-Ley/o2contra%201a%20discrimina
i%F3n.htm.
IS Id.
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This Note will conclude that, despite the new law, Mexico fails to comply
with the NAALC. In reaching that conclusion, this Note will provide an
overview of the NAALC and its treaty obligations in order to establish, first,
the NAALC treaty relationship between the United States and Mexico, and,
second, the effect of non-compliance by Mexico. Thereupon, a sketch of
traditional Mexican discrimination law and enforcement will demonstrate the
failure of Mexico, historically, to provide equal opportunity in
employment-even after the assumption of obligations under the NAALC.
After summarizing previous Mexican efforts toward anti-discrimination, this
Note will discuss Ley Federal para Prevenir y Eliminar la Discriminaci6n,
with particular attention given to: its definition of discrimination, the range of
employers covered by the law, the mechanism by which the law was
promulgated, and the creation of a government enforcement agency.
Once this Note establishes the background in Mexican employment
discrimination law, it will provide an assessment of the new law's viability in
fulfilling Mexico's obligation under the NAALC. First, this Note will consider
the issue of its applicability only to federal employers. Second, this Note will
argue that only individual discrimination cases (as opposed to group
discrimination cases) might be allowed under the statute. Third and finally,
this Note will probe the constitutionality of Congress' passing such a law, and
contend that the law stands on questionable-though likely
sufficient-constitutional ground. These inquiries will lead to the conclusion
that the viability of the Mexican law is so undercut by practical concerns as to
render the law insufficient to fulfill NAALC obligations.
II. SETTING THE STAGE FOR REFORM: INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS,
EXISTING DISCRIMINATION LAW, AND LEY FEDERAL PARA
PREVENIR Y ELIMINAR LA DISCRIMINACION
Signed in 1993 as a side agreement to NAFTA, the NAALC established a
goal of fighting employment discrimination while maintaining the ability for
each member state to choose its own means of countering said discrimination.
The NAALC respects each member nation's constitution and right to set its
own domestic labor standards. It demands that each party "ensure that its labor
laws and regulations provide for high labor standards" and "continue to strive
to improve those standards in that light."' 6 Further, each party is required to
promote compliance and effectively enforce its labor law, including (if
6 NAALC, supra note 5, art. 2.
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necessary) "initiating, in a timely manner, proceedings to seek appropriate
sanctions or remedies for violations of its labor law."' 7
Mexican treaty law, along with the laws of the Mexican Congress, is the
"supreme law of the union."' 8 Consequently, when the NAALC was signed by
the President and approved by the Senate, Mexico adopted a binding treaty
obligation to promote compliance with and to effectively enforce-at the very
least-its own employment discrimination laws. When a party fails to fulfill
treaty obligations under the NAALC, the violating party may not only be
subject to consultations from the other member states, 9 but also may be open
to investigation by the Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE).2 °
Regardless of whether challenges to a violating member state's enforcement
of its labor laws are likely to result in timely or significant changes for the
victims of the adverse employment actions,2 lack of enforcement is a violation
of the NAALC and exposes a party to remedial actions by the other member
nations.22 A "violation" is assessed relative to the domestic law of the
individual member states.23  Before deciding whether current law and
enforcement satisfy the NAALC, the body of Mexican employment
discrimination law must first be explored, both under Mexico's constitutional
mandates and under Mexico's new statute.
A. Employment Discrimination Under the Constitution and the FederalLabor
Law
The Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (Constitution)
was formed largely in response to societal discrimination that has existed since
colonial times.24 The Constitution of 1917 provides that all people are equal,25
17 Id. art. 3(1)(g).
28 CONST1TUCI6N POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS [Const.], as amended
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 5 de Febrero de 1917, art. 133 (Mex.).
"9 NAALC, supra note 5, art. 22 (stating that consultation is the preferred route of
resolution).
20 Id. art. 23 (stating that ECE investigation only is to be conducted only if consultations
fail).
2 See, e.g., John P. Isa, Note, Testing the NAALC's Dispute Resolution System: A Case
Study, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 179, 216-17 (1999) (concluding that the United
States and Canada should strive "to add more 'teeth' to the NAALC, or dispose of the agreement
altogether").
22 NAALC, supra note 5, arts. 22, 23.
23 Id. art. 3.
24 Beatriz Elena Paredes Rangel, Dictamen Expide la Ley Federal para Preveniry Eliminar
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and, specifically, that salary discrimination based on sex and nationality is
prohibited.26 The remaining body of text in Article 123 provides a laundry list
of protections and rights of workers, ranging from limited hours of nighttime
labor, to the right to strike, to protection from unfair contractual conditions.27
The Constitution, subsequently, has been amended in Article 4 to reflect
guarantees against discrimination by placing men and women on equal footing
in the eyes of the law, 28 and by recognizing and protecting the value of
indigenous cultures and languages.29
A 2001 amendment to Article 1 most precisely shows the expanded scope
of constitutional protection. Whereas the original article stated that "todo
individuo" (every individual) will enjoy the constitutional guarantees,30 the
amended article specifically prohibits discrimination motivated by ethnic or
national origin, gender, age, disability, social condition, health condition,
religion, opinion/political persuasion, preference, marital status, or "whatever
other reason that affronts human dignity and has as its object to annul or
diminish the rights and liberties of the people.,'3 By better defining the scope
Ia Discriminaci6n, 58th Leg., 10de Abril de 2003 (statement of Representative Paredes Rangel
to the Cdmara de Diputados), available at http://diputados.pan.org.mx/web/pan/hoycam/
despliega.asp?id=374804.
25 CONSTITUCIfN POdITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS art. 1 ("Todo individuo
gozar6 de las garantias que otorga esta Constitucidn." [Every individual will enjoy the
guarantees that this Constitution grants.]).
26 Id. art. 123, cl. VII.
27 Id. art. 123, cl. I, XVII, XXVII.
28 Decreto que Reforma y Adiciona los Articulos 4o., 5o., 30 y 123 de la Constituci6n
Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos en Relaci6n con la Igualdad Juridica de la Mujer
[Decree that Reforms and Adds to Articles 4, 5, 30 and 123 of the Constitution of Mexico in
Relation to the Legal Equality of Women], Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 31 de
Diciembre de 1974 (amending article 4) El vardn y la mujer son iguales ante la ley. Esta
protegerd la organizacifn y el desarrollo de lafamilia. [Man and woman are equal under the
law. This will protect the organization and development of the family.]
29 Decreto por el que se Reforma el Articulo 2o. de la Constituci6n Politica de los Estados
Unidos Mexicanos [Decree by Which Article 4 of the Constitution of Mexico Is Reformed],
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 28 de Enero de 1992.
30 CONSOrrucIN POLTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MExiCANOS art. 1.
3' Decreto por to por el que se Aprueba el Diverso por el que se Adicionan un Segundo y
Tercer Prrafos el Articulo lo., se Reforma el articulo 2o., se Deroga el P-rafo Primero del
Articulo 4o.; y se Adicionan un Sexto P&rafo al Articulo 18, y un Ultimo PTrrafo a la Fracci6n
Tercera del Articulo 115 de la Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Decree
by Which Diversity is Approved, and by Which Second and Third Paragraphs Are Added to
Article 1, Article 2 Is Reformed, the First Paragraph of Article 4 Is Repealed, and a Sixth
Paragraph to Article 18 and a Last Paragraph to the Third Part of Article 115 Are Added to the
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of constitutional protection, the 2001 amendment reveals a greater awareness
of the need to protect disadvantaged group members.
Ley Federal del Trabajo (Federal Labor Law) was enacted in 1931 to
effectuate the labor standards proclaimed in the Constitution of 1917.32 The
Federal Labor Law furthers the anti-discriminatory goals within the
Constitution by prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of race,
sex, age, religion, political persuasion, or social condition.33 Unfortunately,
both the Federal Labor Law and the Constitution itself lack the needed
mechanisms to enforce Mexico's employment discrimination policy.34
B. The Contours ofLey Federal Para Preveniry Eliminar la Discriminaci6n
Ley Federal para Prevenir y Eliminar la Discriminaci6n was passed
unanimously by the Cdmara de Diputados, Mexico's Congress. 3s Before it
passed, statements were made by several representatives highlighting the
reasons for the law. Initially, two social justice reasons were given for the new
law: first, that everyone (by necessarily being a member of at least the
protected classes of age and sex), potentially, is subject to adverse
discrimination,36 and, second, that democracy falters absent protection from
Constitution of Mexico.], Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 14 de Agosto de 2001.
32 LEY FEDERAL DEL TRABAJO [L.F.T.] [Federal Labor Law], as amended, Diario Oficial de
le Federaci6n [D.O.], 1 de Abril de 1970, art. 1 (Mex.).
3Id. art. 3.
3 Barry LaSala, NAFTA and Worker Rights: An Analysis of the Labor Side Accord After
Five Years of Operation and Suggested Improvements, 16 LAB. LAW. 319, 335-36 (2001)
(observing that Mexican workers are unaware of their rights and that Mexican institutions for
enforcement suffer from administrative indifference and bias). But see Michael Joseph
McGuinness, The Politics of Labor Regulation in North America: A Reconsideration ofLabor
Law Enforcement in Mexico, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1, 19 (2000) (arguing that many
contemporary condemnations ofthe enforcement of Mexican labor laws are based on stereotypes
of Mexican public officials and incomplete research, that a lack of funding largely is responsible
for under-enforcement, and that new anti-corruption programs largely resolve many of the fears
of bias regarding the Ministry of Labor).
" Votaci6n del Dictamenpor el que se Expide la Ley Federal para Preveniry Eliminar la
Discriminaci6n, 58th Leg., 10 de Abril de 2003, available at http://diputados.pan.org.mx/web/
pan/hoycam/despliega.asp?id=374817 (there were absences); see also Jos6 Manuel del Rio
Virgen, Dictamen Expide la Ley Federal para PreveniryEliminar la Discriminaci6n, 58th Leg.,
10 de Abril de 2003, available athttp://diputados.pan.org.mx/web/pan/hoycam/despliega.asp?
id=374797 (statement by the Representative on the need for a rhetorical message of a unanimous
vote).
36 Hortensia Aragon Castillo, Dictamen Expide la Ley Federal para Preveniry Eliminar la
Discriminaci6n, 58th Leg., 10 de Abril de 2003, available at http://diputados.pan.org.mx/web/
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discrimination 7 and risks spiraling into an atrocity.38 Additionally, a structural
argument was raised: the Constitution (specifically Articles 1 and 4) demands
the implementation of anti-discriminatory measures; thus, the law is a renewed
effort at achieving the stated goals of the Constitution.39 Finally, international
legal reasons were addressed: by enacting the law, Mexico not only would be
viewed more favorably by the international community, but also would be
taking a significant step toward fulfilling several of its treaty obligations.4°
The text of Ley Federal para Preveniry Eliminar la Discriminaci6n builds
from these justifications to create an expansive prohibition on employment
discrimination, enforced by a new government agency, and designed to interact
with international law. First, the scope of protection offered (i.e., the defined
set of protected classes) is far greater than the scope offered under Title VII in
the United States.4 While this does not inherently make Mexico's law
sufficient, it does show that the scope of Mexico's law offers comparable
protection from discrimination to that afforded by another party to the
NAALC.
Second, the law coordinates domestic and international law on employment
discrimination. It states that "interpretation of the content of this law, and the
actions of the federal authorities, will be congruent with the applicable
international instruments on discrimination of which Mexico is a part. 42
Further, when there are different interpretations of the law and its coordination
with international agreements, the interpretation that most efficaciously
protects the victims of discrimination is to be preferred.43 Consequently,
pan/hoycam/despliega.asp?id=374800.
" German Arturo Pellegrini Perez, Dictamen Expide la Ley Federal para Prevenir y
Eliminar la Discriminaci6n, 58th Leg., 10 de Abril de 2003, available at http://diputados.pan.
org.mx/web/pan/hoycam/despliega.asp?id=374795.
38 Aragon Castillo, supra note 36 (the Representative observed that the Holocaust was the
product of extreme discrimination against Jews).
'9 See Paredes Rangel, supra note 24; see also Aragon Castillo, supra note 36, andPellegrini
Perez, supra note 37.
40 Paredes Rengal, supra note 24. Specifically, the Representative suggests that Ley Federal
Para Preveniry Eliminar la Discriminaci6n will satisfy Mexico's treaty obligations under the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the
Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Persons
with Disabilities, and the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958. No
express mention is made of Mexico's treaty obligations under the NAALC. Id.
41 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
42 Ley para Prevenir la Discriminaci6n art. 6.
41 Id. art. 7.
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whichever law is more protective-whether it is international or domestic in
nature-is the one that provides the rule of interpretation.
Third-and perhaps most significant-Mexico's law provides for the
creation of a new administrative agency for the purposes of implementing the
law: El Consejo Nacionalpara Prevenir Discriminaci6n (National Council to
Prevent Discrimination) (CONAPRED)." CONAPRED is a decentralized
organization under the Secretary of Government, with a juridical nature and
a budget all its own.45
Historically, Mexican workers have been unaware of their rights, and prior
efforts at administration have been subject to bias toward employers. 46 Anti-
discrimination principles in the Constitution were to be enforced by both the
state and local governments, but no further specification on administration was
given.47 Mexico's 1976 Ley Orgdnica de la Administraci6n Pztblica Federal
placed the burden of enforcing the federal labor law on the Ministry of Labor
and Social Welfare. 48  However, allegations of corruption4 9 and a lack of
resources 50 plagued the prior administrative system. Arguably, CONAPRED
can be seen largely as a new chance for execution of employment
discrimination law in Mexico.
" Id. art. 16.
45 Id.
4 LaSala, supra note 34, at 335-36.
" McGuinness, supra note 34, at 19.
48 LeyOrgtnica de la Administraci6n PiTblica Federal [L.O.A.P.F.] [Executive Branch Law],
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 29 de Diciembre de 1976 (directing in Article 40, § 1 that
the Secretary of Labor oversee the application of relevant constitutional provisions (including
Article 123) to the Federal Labor Law); id.
41 McGuinness, supra note 34, at 19 (maintaining that fear of administrative corruption is
primarily the result of unfair stereotypes). However, as recently as 1998, there have been
accusations of impartiality by the Conciliation and Arbitration Boards responsible for
adjudicating labor disputes. See, e.g., Submission to the United States National Administrative
Office (NAO) Regarding Impending Irreparable Harm Against the Right to Freedom of
Association, Protection of the Rights to Organize and the Right to Bargain Collectively and
Persistent Pattern of Failure to Enforce Labor Law: The Case of Han Young de Mexico, S.A. de
C.V., Submission No. 9702 (U.S. Nat'l Admin. Office, Bureau oflnt'l Labor Affairs, U.S. Dep't
of Labor Apr. 28, 1998) (submitted by International Labor Rights Fund et al.) [hereinafter NAO
Submission No. 9702], available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/nao/pubrep9702.htm.
50 Stephen F. Befort & Virginia E. Cornett, Beyond the Rhetoric of the NAFTA Treaty
Debate: A Comparative Analysis of Labor and Employment Law in Mexico and the United
States, 17 COMP. LAB. L.J. 269, 300 (1996) (arguing that limited administrative resources
inhibited general enforcement of Mexico's labor and employment laws).
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CONAPRED is responsible for proposing and evaluating the execution of
Mexico's anti-discrimination law.5 The evaluative function is reminiscent of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) ability to create
regulations and issue interpretations of Title VII in the United States.52
However, CONAPRED might actually have a stronger role than the EEOC has
in the legislative process. Unlike the EEOC, criticism by CONAPRED
constitutes a stage in the creation of new anti-discrimination law: CONAPRED
may express opinions on employment discrimination laws proposed by the
President even before those laws are submitted to Congress.53 Additionally,
CONAPRED's opinions and regulations are to be made based entirely on its
own files, independent of the instructions of any other authority or public
servant.
54
The great degree of autonomy granted to CONAPRED, combined with the
agency's position within the legislative process, strongly suggest that, going
forward, CONAPRED will play a very powerful role in crafting and executing
discrimination law. Increased autonomy will likely make CONAPRED less
susceptible to allegations of corruption by facially distancing the agency from
potential detracting. The agency's power to interject its opinions when the
President proposes legislation, effectively, means the agency will have its
mouth to the ear of the Executive. Thus, via the President, CONAPRED can
best design the rules under which it will work.
Finally, it should be noted that, as of June 2004, CONAPRED claimed to
have an operating budget that was too limited, and requested more funding for
2005."5 Whether the 2004 funding truly was inadequate and whether further
" Ley para Prevenir la Discriminaci6n art. 20.
52 Congress gave the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) the power to
issue procedural regulations, but withheld the power to issue substantive regulations under Title
VII. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (200 1). Further, the United States Supreme
Court has afforded little deference to EEOC substantive interpretations of discrimination law.
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 481 (1999) (declining to apply an EEOC
interpretation of substantive law to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990).
" Ley para Prevenir la Discriminaci6n art. 20, cl. VI.
14 Estatuto Orgdnico del Consejo Nacional para Prevenir la Discriminaci6n [Law of the
National Board for Preventing Discrimination], Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 26 de
Abril de 2004. Distinct autonomy is given to the administrative agency: "In the performance of
its functions and in the exercise of its autonomy, El Consejo will not receive instructions from
any authority or public servant. Its resolutions will be based solely on the records that constitute
its files." Id. art. 3.
" Demanda Conapredmds Presupuestopara 2005 [Conapred Demands Greater Funding
for 2005], DIARIO DE MEXICO, June 29,2004, available at http://www.diariodemexico.com.mx/
?module=displaystory&story-id=29181 &edition-id=357&format=-html. CONAPRED fears that
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budget requests will be met are political decisions for the Mexican Congress
to address. Although inadequate funding might ultimately condemn the anti-
discrimination law to the same fate as its predecessors, this Note will focus on
the textual scope of the statute (e.g., which employers are eligible to be
defendants and whether individual discrimination cases may be brought) and
the constitutionality of the law.
II. LIMITS TO MEXICO'S EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND THE
RISK OF FURTHER NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE NAALC
Due to the relative youth of Ley Federal para Prevenir y Eliminar la
Discriminaci6n in the larger history of Mexican discrimination law, the law
has not been subject to extensive criticism. To date, the author could find only
one article in an United States legal journal that has even mentioned the law.56
Discourse within the Mexican legal community has presented three particular
critiques of the law. First, only federal employers are subject to the broad
prohibitions within Article 4 (an argument as to the range of statutory
defendants). 7 Second, only discrimination against individuals, and not against
groups, is actionable (an argument as to the number of viable theories of
recovery).58 Third, the law is unconstitutional since federal discrimination law
its ability to adequately educate the public and investigate claims will be compromised if funds
are not increased. Id.
56 See Natara Williams, Note, Pre-Hire Pregnancy Screening in Mexico 's Maquiladoras:
Is it Discrimination?, 12 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 131 (2005) (briefly mentioning the new
law).
7 Cortez Moralez, supra note 14.
58 Id. Although presuming American law to be ideal would be imprudent, U.S. law might
serve as a guide to what theories of recovery are available and to what pertinent evidentiary
burdens and potential remedies exist. There are three overarching approaches to proving
employment discrimination in the United States. First, individual disparate treatment theory
(that the plaintiff, individually and without regard to others, has been the victim of
discrimination) is available under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA. See, e.g., Hazen Paper
Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993). Second, systemic disparate treatment theory (that the
plaintiff has been the victim of a pattern or practice of discrimination adopted expressly or
impliedly by the employer) is also available under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA. See, e.g.,
L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). Third, disparate impact theory
(that the defendant's policy has a discriminatory effect against the plaintiff-regardless of
motive) is available under Title VII and the ADA, but may not be under the ADEA. See, e.g.,
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Should the latter two theories not be available
in Mexico, plaintiffs who suffered, for example, from a facially neutral hiring policy with an
inadvertent discriminatory effect would have no available theory for recovery. Consequently,
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is properly legislated only by the Human Rights Commission (a constitutional
argument on the limit of congressional power).,9
Clearly, an unconstitutional law would prove unenforceable, and therefore
Mexico's NAALC treaty obligations would remain unfulfilled, just as before
the enactment of the new law. In addition, should the law excessively limit the
class of eligible defendants or unduly restrict the number of available theories
for recovery under the act, the internal constitutional mandates against
discrimination might remain unfulfilled. Consequently, Mexico would be
deemed to have inadequately adhered to its employment discrimination law,
and would be in violation of the NAALC. Only by overcoming each of these
hurdles-the textual limits and the constitutional limit-can Mexico fulfill its
constitutional mandate of protection and thus make meaningful progress
towards satisfying the NAALC.
A. The Limited Range of Statutory Employers
Ley Federal para Preveniry Eliminar la Discriminaci6n contains various
provisions suggesting the range of employers eligible to be defendants for
purposes of the statute. On the one hand, Article 9 specifically states "queda
prohibida todaprdctica discriminatoria que tengapor objeto impedir o anular
el reconocimiento o ejercicio de los derechos y la igualdad real de
oportunidades" (all discriminatory practices whose object is to impede or
annul the recognition or exercise of rights and real equality of opportunity are
prohibited).6 ° Certainly, this broad prohibition-stated after the definition of
discrimination for purposes of the statute-is not expressly limited to federal
and other state employers. Further, if the Congress wanted to limit the scope
of the law only to governmental employers, it would have made sense to
include such language within Article 9.61 Consequently, the lack of express
limitation to governmental employers within the general statutory ban on
employment discrimination suggests that the law is not so limited, and that
private employers (such as Zenith and General Motors)62 are also liable.
if large portions of the work force would need to make use of an impact theory, but would be
precluded from doing so, the constitutional goals of protection from discrimination and equality
between the sexes would remain unfulfilled, as would Mexico's NAALC obligations.
9 Gil Rend6n, supra note 13, at 165-66.
o Ley para Prevenir la Discriminaci6n art. 9.
61 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2003) (exhibiting that Article 9
functions much like § 2000e-2(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
62 NAO Submission No. 9701, supra note 2.
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On the other hand, different provisions suggest-but do not expressly
state-that Article 9 is limited to government employers. Articles 10 through
15 are worded in primarily the same way: "public organs and federal
authorities, within their jurisdiction, shall carry into effect, among others, the
following measures in favor of equal opportunity" 63 for women,' for
children,65 for people over sixty,66 for disabled persons,67 and for the
indigenous population.68 Further, a catch-all provision is tacked onto the end
of the list, providing that those public organs and federal authorities also must
"adopt the means that tend to favor the real equality of opportunity and that
tend to favor the prevention and elimination of the forms of discrimination
against all other persons protected under Article 4.,69 Roughly 10% of the
total text of the Mexican law is devoted to these government-specific
proscriptions. Consequently, it would appear that the Congress-by focusing
on the requirements for governmental employers, but neglecting to extend the
same list to private employers-has narrowed the scope to prevent suits against
such private employers under the law.
If the law is limited to government employers, innumerable potential
plaintiffs (including the women in Tijuana complaining against Zenith and
General Motors) would have no claim under the new Mexican law. ° On that
basis alone the number of people who could succeed in enforcing their
constitutional rights against discrimination is substantially limited. Countless
other victims of discrimination will go without remedy. Thus, the new law
may fail to satisfy the NAALC since Mexican constitutional rights will be only
partially protected.
63 Ley para Prevenir la Discriminaci6n arts. 10-15 ("Los 6rganospziblicosy las autoridades
federales, en el dmbito de su competencia, llevarin a cabo, entre otras, las siguientes mediolas
positivas y compensatorias afavor de la igualdad de oportunidades.").
64 Id. art. 10.
6 I d. art. 11.
66 Id. art. 12.
67 Id. art. 13.
68 Id. art. 14.
69 Id. art. 15 ("Los,6rganos ptblicos y las autoridadesfederales adoptardn las medidas que
tiendan afavorecer la igualdad real de oportunidades y a prevenir y eliminar las formas de
discriminaci6n de las personas a que se refiere el articulo 4 de esta Ley.").
70 See Cortez Moralez, supra note 14 (arguing that the new statute neglects the
discriminatory practices that men and women suffer daily in their localities and municipalities).
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B. Available Theories of Discrimination
Even though Mexico's new discrimination law might only apply to federal
employment relationships, admittedly, some discriminatory employment
practices would be covered by the new law. Thus, some benefit from the law
(even if no state, municipal, or private employers are covered) might be had.
However, there is another limitation upon the practical scope of the law: it
does not seem to apply to group claims of discrimination.7 A comparison to
the employment discrimination law of the United States may prove fruitful in
showing the importance of a group claim.72 U.S. law can reveal weaknesses
in Mexican law by showing the potential effect of not having a group
discrimination theory.
1. A Comparison to U.S. Law: Benefits of Group Theories of
Discrimination
Under Title VII in the United States, there are two group discrimination
theories available to plaintiffs: systemic disparate treatment theory and
disparate impact theory. Individual disparate treatment theory,73 the most
common U.S. theory of employment discrimination, appears to be authorized
by the Mexican statute.74 Whether theories similar to systemic disparate
71 Mexican case law on this topic could be illustrative of trial procedures and available
theories, but the general non-precedentary nature of Mexican law (Mexico is a civil law
jurisdiction), combined with the recency of the new law and the lack of existing case law, make
observations on theories of recovery impossible at the current time. Neither the reports of the
Supreme Court of Mexico nor the recommendations of the National Human Rights Commission
have yet revealed case law involving the new statute. However, when case law becomes
available, it should be given weight as a guide for future litigation. See Jorge A. Vargas, An
Introductory Lesson to Mexican Law: From Constitutions and Codes to Legal Culture and
NAFTA, 41 SANDEGo L. REV. 1337, 1353 (2004).
72 Before suggesting the contours of group discrimination claims, there is a need to highlight
the limits in making comparisons to United States discrimination law. As previously noted, U.S.
discrimination law serves as only one example of how to set up and enforce employment
standards. To read any observations about U.S. law as prescriptions for Mexican compliance
with the NAALC is inappropriate.
13 Individual disparate treatment litigation in the United States explores whether an
employer's action has discriminated against an individual employee on the basis of her or his
protected class status. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
" Title VII expressly divides intentional discrimination (i.e., employment practices that
either expressly or impliedly discriminate) from employment practices that have a disparate
impact based on protected class status. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(l)
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treatment and disparate impact actually exist in Mexico is unclear. Their
absence would greatly diminish the chances of recovery for abused workers.
i. Benefits of a Systemic Disparate Treatment Theory
In the United States, systemic disparate treatment theory enables employees
to sue under two fact patterns: first, where the employer has an announced,
formal policy of discrimination; second, when the employer engages in a
pattern or practice of seemingly discriminatory employment decisions.75
Systemic disparate treatment theory is specifically addressed by statute.76
While the rebuttable presumptions and shifting burdens of U.S. law 77 need not
be adopted by another nation, other more universal benefits remain.
First, and most simply, having a systemic disparate treatment theory means
that a pool of plaintiffs-not just one individual plaintiff-can cover the cost
of litigation if attorneys fees are required. Second, increasing the number of
member plaintiffs with similar stories of suspected discrimination helps
strengthen the inference of actual discrimination. Third, different types of
evidence (such as statistical evidence) might be admissible under a systemic
disparate treatment theory in support of an inference of discrimination.78
Fourth, especially where the complainants still work for the alleged
discriminating employer, having a group theory might reduce psychological
(1991). Individual disparate treatment cases are expressly grounded in the language of the
general prohibition against discrimination: "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,"
which clearly focuses on an individual suffering an adverse employment practice. Civil Rights
Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2003). Mexican discrimination law, in contrast, broadly
prohibits basing employment decisions on any one of the various protected class statuses, yet
makes no distinction between discrimination against individuals and that against groups. The
statute provides a long list of prohibitions, but they just as easily could apply to individuals or
to groups. Ley para Prevenir la Discriminaci6n art. 9.
" MICHAEL ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 199
(6th ed. 2003).
76 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) (instead of the Attorney
General, per Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c)) may bring suit against "any
person or group of persons engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment
of any of the rights secured by this title." The fact that such employers are repeat violators
presumably increases the public's interest and warrants litigation by the EEOC in place of
private counsel. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-6(a) (2003).
77 See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
78 See id. While the type of and weight given to statistical evidence could vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the very presence of any statistical evidence would help bring
plaintiffs one step closer to a judgment in their favor.
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barriers to suit. The risk of retaliation might better be dispersed among a pool
of employees rather than just one, and complainants might not feel like they
alone suffered the abuse, but might be bolstered from a sense of being in a
"community of abused." Both of these psychological benefits could stem from
a sense of group identity established by not having to litigate alone.
Fifth, in the case of an unintentional discriminator,79 having a group of
plaintiffs bring a complaint could prove to the employer that her
decisions-what she previously thought might have resulted in isolated gripes
by unsatisfied employees acting for other reasons-were in fact
discriminatory. In that situation, should internal complaint mechanisms not be
used for whatever reason (or should they be used by an employee, but not be
adequately considered by an employer), a group claim might help prompt the
employer to resolve the dispute at an early stage in the litigation.
Sixth, while individual disparate treatment cases might typify
discrimination among smaller employers,8" larger employers tend to make
more employment decisions. Consequently, rather than face a flood of
individual disparate treatment suits, utilizing a group discrimination theory,
such as systemic disparate treatment, would be more efficient because it would
condense the number of times a defendant's counsel needs to examine
evidence common to each case, and would reduce the total hours spent in
court, thereby decreasing both court and attorneys' fees.
Seventh, there is a sense, borrowed from the English evidentiary tradition
of res gestae, wherein the full story might need to be told for a more complete
picture of the alleged unlawful acts. Without that complete picture, a court
might be unable to meet any deterrent goals in its judgment. If, for example,
an employer is found to discriminate only once (i.e., an individual disparate
treatment case), a court might be less secure in its determination that unlawful
discrimination actually occurred and that full punishment is necessary.
However, where a pattern or practice is established, the pervasiveness of the
employer's acts might suggest to the court that more severe punishment is
warranted. In this sense, only enabling individual disparate treatment claims
might under-deter employers from discriminating. Having a group theory
would better prevent future acts of individual discrimination and employer
policies or patterns of discrimination.
" For example, an unintentional discriminator might include an employer who bears no
animus based on protected class status, but instead inadvertently discriminates.
'0 Smaller employers seem less likely to have a need to adopt formal employment policies
or to have made enough employment decisions to reveal a pattern of discrimination.
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Consequently, permitting systemic disparate treatment theory would
strengthen anti-discrimination law. Not having such a theory exposes
individual plaintiffs to the full costs of litigation, gives them less inferential
support, provides them with fewer forms of relevant evidence, and strands
them as individuals subject to the wrath of employer retaliation. Additionally,
employers are less likely to discover their inadvertent discrimination, are
forced to pay higher court costs and attorneys fees (should they lose), and are
under-deterred from future discrimination. In summary, the increased ease and
likelihood of success under systemic disparate treatment makes it a useful
theory for victims of discrimination.
ii. Benefits of a Disparate Impact Theory
The second group discrimination theory available under U.S. law is
disparate impact theory. Disparate impact theory-like systemic disparate
treatment theory-is expressly authorized by statute.8l Impact theory requires
the plaintiff to show that the defendant used a particular employment practice
that caused a disparate impact on a protected class. 2 For example, where an
employer requires intelligence tests as a condition of employment and those
tests (1) are not significantly related to successful job performance, and (2)
have the effect of disqualifying members of a protected class at a higher rate
than members of the majority class, there is a disparate impact upon the
protected class members.8 3 Further, discriminatory intent is not required for
a finding of disparate impact since impact is the focus.8 4
Impact theory provides notable benefits to plaintiffs. First, unlike systemic
disparate treatment theory, impact theory does not rely on any finding of
discriminatory intent. The only thing that matters is a finding of
discriminatory effect.8 5 On an evidentiary level, statistical evidence (readily
obtainable from a statistician) could easily show a discriminatory effect, and
the need for direct evidence (which is often difficult to obtain) or for other
circumstantial evidence would be limited. 6 Second, impact theory could also
81 Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2003).
82 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
83 Id.
84 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986-87 (1988).
85 Griggs, 401 U.S. 424, 431.
86 MICHAEL ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 75, at 366-73.
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be brought by individuals or by groups,8 7 and thus would garner all of the other
advantages listed above under systemic disparate treatment theory.
2. Existence of Group Theories of Discrimination in Mexico
In his exigent observation the day after Mexico passed Ley Federalpara
Prevenir y Eliminar la Discriminacirn, Cortez Moralez, Director of the
"Miguel Agustin Pro Juirez" Center for Human Rights, stated that the new law
"only observed discrimination against individuals, excluding that against
groups or collectives." 8 Although one might venture that Moralez made an
undeveloped, knee-jerk reaction to the new law,89 a close analysis of the law
reveals that the statute almost certainly does not make a systemic disparate
treatment theory available in Mexico, nor is it likely that a disparate impact
theory is available.
i. Existence of a Systemic Disparate Treatment Theory in Mexico
Systemic disparate treatment theory is almost certainly unavailable under
Mexican law. Unlike the prohibition against employment discrimination in the
United States,90 Mexico's ban lacks an explicit reference to the singularity or
plurality of plaintiffs.9' The general purpose of the law, as stated in Article 1,
"is to prevent and eliminate all forms of discrimination" against any person.92
The sweeping stance from Article 1 is echoed in Article 9: a catch-all
provision that states, in general, that any discriminatory conduct not
specifically listed in the preceding twenty-eight provisions might still be
prohibited. 93 The breadth of these two articles suggests that, despite the
absence of express authorization for either group discrimination theory, if, in
the interest of prohibiting discrimination, such a theory is needed, then it is
authorized by the statute.
87 Compare Watson, 487 U.S. 977, with Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478 (3d
Cir. 1999).
88 Cortez Moralez, supra note 14.
89 Moralez's observations are listed as six brief complaints regarding the new law, none of
which are supported or explained. Id. Additionally, scholarly writings on the new law have not
focused on this aspect of the statute.
9' See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
9' Ley para Prevenir la Discriminaci6n art. 4.
9' Id. art. 1 ("El objeto ... es prevenir y eliminar todas lasformas de discriminacirn").
9' Id. art. 9(XXIX).
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However, some language in Article 1 cuts against the inclusion of a group
theory, despite the broad policy against discrimination. Although the general
policy goal seems clear by itself, the members of Mexico's Congress qualified
the policy goal as follows: "against any person in the terms of Article 1 of the
Constitution. 94 The text of the statute clearly specifies "cualquier persona"
(any person) and does not include a plural form in the alternative. The
question becomes how to interpret "cualquierpersona"--whether it is limited
to single plaintiffs or is intended to cover plaintiffs in the aggregate.
Articles 6 and 7 provide the interpretive guidelines that (1) interpretation
of the law will be congruent with the applicable international instruments to
which Mexico is a party,9" and (2) when different interpretations are possible,
the courts should prefer that reading which better protects the persons or
groups affected by the discriminatory conduct.96 Given the language of the
interpretive guidelines, group discrimination theories seem plausible, first, as
a way to ensure that international obligations, such as those arising from the
NAALC, are met, and, second, as a way to better protect the rights of
employees. The laundry list of advantages previously articulated for both
systemic disparate treatment and disparate impact theories certainly suggests
that worker rights would be best protected by recognizing group discrimination
theories under the interpretive guidelines.
In spite of the broad language used in the interpretive guidelines of Articles
6 and 7, the practical effect of those provisions is likely limited. As to Article
6, the operative word is "congruent,"97 suggesting that Mexico's statute should
not be construed in such a way as to conflict with treaties to which Mexico is
a party. However, the NAALC does not require that Mexico have individual
and systemic disparate treatment theories, nor a disparate impact theory. The
9' Id. art. 1 ("preveniry eliminar todas lasformas de discriminacidn que se ejerzan contra
cualquier persona en los trminos del Articulo 1 de la Constitucidn Politica").
9' Id. art. 6.
96 Id. art. 7. Note that, while "protects with better efficacy the persons or groups that would
be affected" includes "persons or groups" (and seemingly allows for a group discrimination
theory), the language refers to the practical impact of discrimination upon individuals in the
aggregate. However, Article 7 does not expressly authorize, nor even make mention of, a group
discrimination claim. Inclusion of the plural "persons or groups" simply mirrors the reality of
class status per Article 4: that multiple people form the classes of sex, age, disability, etc.
Consequently, Article 7 only has value as guidance for how to best protect those individuals who
suffer discrimination.
97 Id. art. 6.
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principle requirement of the NAALC is that the member nations uphold their
own employment discrimination laws.98
Likewise, Mexico is not obligated to apply those alternative theories under
other treaties. Clearly, fulfilling certain treaty obligations was on the minds
of at least some of Mexico's lawmakers at the time of drafting.99 However, no
such references to these alternative theories exist. Consequently, a more
realistic reading of Article 6 is that Mexico's statute is not to be interpreted to
contradict (i.e., be incongruent with) the terms and spirit of Mexico's treaties.
Since there is no international legal requirement for group discrimination
theory, Mexico's efforts would be congruent without such a theory. Article 6
merely seems to be a general guide confirming the spirit of the law, while
referencing Mexico's renewed intent to uphold its employment discrimination
standards.
Article 7, initially, also seems to favor the acceptance of group
discrimination theories, since the legislature mandates that the law be
interpreted-where there is conflict-to better protect those discriminated
against (i.e., err in the favor of the plaintiff in matters of statutory
interpretation).1"' Central to reading Article 7 is the rule concerning conflicts
of interpretation ("cuando sepresenten diferentes interpretaciones")."' As a
matter of simple logic, admittedly unreasonable interpretations under any law
should not be given credence; even under a loose standard, utterly unsupported
interpretations will not stand.
The issue becomes whether either group discrimination theory can
reasonably be read from Mexico's statute. On the one hand, the availability
of group discrimination theories furthers the general purpose of preventing and
eliminating discrimination.102 On the other hand, that purpose is limited via
the language of the statute to individuals, not groups.'0 3 Additionally, at no
point in the statute is either group theory discussed. Surely, if Mexico's
legislature wanted to make such theories available, it would have so stated.
Further, if group theories were within the concern of the legislature, specific
references to those theories might be expected. However, in my review of the
statements of the diputados (members of Congress), no concern was expressed
over the absence of a group to employment discrimination. Consequently, not
98 See supra text accompanying note 7.
99 See supra note 40.
"' Ley para Prevenir la Discriminaci6n art. 7.
101 Id.
102 Id. art. 1.
103 Id. ("contra cualquier persona").
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only is there no explicit textual basis for an interpretation allowing for either
group discrimination theory, there also is no argument from legislative history
or purpose. Articles 6 and 7 will likely be ineffective in providing a group
discrimination theory.
ii. Existence of a Disparate Impact Theory in Mexico
While the prior observations pertain to both systemic disparate treatment
and disparate impact theories, certain provisions might be read in support of
impact theory. However, it does not follow that those provisions would permit
the group theory.
Furthermore, Article 5 cuts against the existence of impact theory by
allowing "in general, all those [acts] that do not have the purpose of annulling
or reducing the rights, liberties, or equal opportunities of people."'' The
Article 5 provision sets forth a general rule that, unless an employment
decision has the purpose of discrimination, it is not prohibited discriminatory
conduct under the Mexican statute. Hence, as a general rule (and as a
conflicting rule for interpretative battles), impact theory should be unavailable
since it does not operate from discriminatory intent. 10 5
On the other hand, two provisions support the availability of a disparate
impact theory. First, Article 9 prohibits "contents," methods, or pedagogical
instruments that assign roles contrary to equality or that propagate a condition
of subordination."16 Second, Article 4 prohibits any distinctions, exclusions,
or restrictions based on a protected class status that have the effect of impeding
or annulling the recognition or exercise of rights or equality."°7 Almost
unquestionably, these two provisions seem to support the incorporation of an
impact theory into the Mexican statute.
With regard to the Article 9 provision, the introductory passage to that
article gives a general prohibition of discrimination that includes a motive
requirement.08 Clause 2 of the article is listed as one example of
discriminatory conduct within the general prohibition, which, as previously
stated, included a motive requirement. Two reasonable interpretations
'o4 Id. art. 5, cl. VIII.
1o See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986-87 (1988).
106 Ley para Prevenir la Discriminaci6n art. 9, cl. II (note especially, "papeles contrarios a
la igualdad o que difundan una condici6n de subordinaci6n").
107 Id. art. 4 ("distinci6n ... que tengapor efecto impedir o anular el reconocimiento o el
ejercicio de los derechos.").
"' Id. art. 9 ("que tenga por objeto impedir o anular... los derechos.").
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therefore exist. On the one hand, Mexico might demand strict adherence to a
motive requirement. Such a position textually is supported with the language
"que tengapor objeto" (to have as its effect)." 9 Since Clause 2 is an example
of the general prohibition, the requirement under Article 9 extends to each of
the examples, including Clause 2; thus, motive would be required.
In favor of impact theory, one might argue that Clause 2 exists as an
example of the general discrimination prohibited. In that case the motive
requirement would be satisfied wherever methods or instruments (e.g.,
education tests) that propagate subordination are found. A finding of effective
subordination or inequality would suffice for the motive requirement. Under
that interpretation an impact theory would exist. " 0
Article 4 further supports that conclusion. On the one hand, Article 4
defines as discrimination those employment decisions that have as their effect
impeding or annulling rights."' On the other hand, the prohibition is
conditioned on the employment decision being "based on" a protected class
status." 2 Standing alone, the text of Article 4 would probably be insufficient
to recognize an impact theory, since the most reasonable interpretation would
likely be that intended discriminatory effects were (but not unintended effects)
prohibited. However, in conjunction with the text of Article 9, the statutory
intent seems to extend not just to intended discriminatory acts, but also to
discriminatory effects. Together with Article 9, Article 4 seems to evidence
the legislature's desire for an impact theory.
The remaining issue is defining the contours of any impact theory that
might exist under the Mexican statute. Even if an impact theory exists, by no
means must it mirror the U.S. impact theory. In the United States, impact
theory commonly (although not necessarily) is used by multiple plaintiffs in
the same suit." 3 The idea of not requiring proof of intent to discriminate is
common to both arrangements; the focus is on effect. Given the fact that
nowhere in Mexico's statute is there any reference to multiple plaintiffs using
impact theory, nor is there any evidence in the legislative history of discussion
of impact theory, said theory seems limited to individual plaintiffs. Thus, even
109 Id.
10 This conclusion is further supported by Article 7, which mandates that splits in
interpretation are to be resolved in favor of the interpretation that better protects individual
rights.
.'. Ley para Prevenir la Discriminaci6n art. 4 ("tengapor efecto impedir o anular").
..2 Id. ("basada en ..").
... Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (multiple plaintiffs), with
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (single plaintiff).
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though individual victims of employment discrimination can prevail by
showing that an employer engaged in a practice, such as requiring certain tests
or standards with a discriminatory effect, the theory still may not be used by
a group of plaintiffs. Thus, all of the benefits of group litigation are not had
under the version of impact theory available in Mexico.
Mexico might not have a treaty obligation to allow group litigation, but it
does have NAALC obligations to promote compliance with, and to enforce
effectively, its labor law. The purpose of the new law would be better served
if group theories were available in Mexico. Individual victims of
discrimination might otherwise be deterred from suit, and those victims willing
to risk suit may otherwise be less likely to prevail. Without group theories,
Mexico will fail to meet its NAALC obligations.
C. CONAPRED: The Agency of Implementation
The third main criticism mounted against Mexico's law is that the statute
is unconstitutional due to its delegation of responsibilities to CONAPRED.
There are two arguments made as to unconstitutionality: one of duplicity and
another of exceeding authority. The first problem arises from the fact that
many of the powers granted to CONAPRED were previously delegated in the
Constitution to the National Commission for Human Rights expressly."1 4 The
National Commission for Human Rights is given autonomy as to its
administration and budget, legal character, and its own assets.'15 Other
commissions and agencies have a subordinate role in the field of human rights,
given that the Commission is the only one with an explicit constitutional basis,
and exclusive power to hear cases for violations of human rights." 6
Commentators, such as Raymundo Gil Rend6n, argue that "neither the
Congress nor any other federal legislative body has the power to create other
organs that protect human rights" beyond those foreseen in Articles 102(b) and
1 of the Constitution."17
The second problem is that Mexico's Congress may not have had the
authority to make the new law in the first place. "The Congress... lacks both
express and implicit power to legislate federal material on the prohibition of
114 CONSTITUCION POLiTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOs art. 102(b).
115 Id. ("El organismo que establezca el Congreso de la Uni6n se denominard Comisi6n
Nacional de los Derechos Humanos; contard con autonomia de gesti6n y presupuestaria,
personalidadjuridica ypatrimonio propios.").
16 Id.; Gil Rend6n, supra note 13, at 165-66.
117 Gil Rend6n, supra note 13, at 166.
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discrimination since it is not a power of Congress under Article 73, but rather
of the federal entities under Article 124."l 18
In response to these arguments, one might argue that while CONAPRED
is not envisioned within Article 102(b), the overriding system of rights from
Article 1 is most important. Since Article 1 gives a general prohibition of
discrimination against a variety of class statuses," 9 and since Article 1 was
amended as recently as 2001, it makes sense that a new organ be made to best
address the new constitutional scope of Article 1. The Commission's previous
workings were in a pre-2001 amendment world. Mexico's subsequent focus
on discrimination (and, in large part, the effects of discrimination on
employment) is radically different from other forms of human rights abuses,
such as unlawful detention and police brutality. Indeed, the best way to reflect
the decision of the amenders is to give substance to the new Article 1 by
creating a new agency centered on employment discrimination, as opposed to
discrimination and human rights in general. Further, Article 102(b) should not
be read to exclude the existence of all other agencies; the first paragraph of the
article specifically states that "Congress . . . will establish organs for the
protection of human rights."' 2° Thus, since other organs may be created and
since the purpose and scope of CONAPRED and the Commission are not
necessarily overlapping, there may not be any real duplicity problem. This
conclusion is bolstered by the fact that, over the last two years, one is hard
pressed to find a single employment discrimination case among the
Recomendaciones published by the Commission.' 2 '
Even if there is no practical duplicity problem, the issue remains whether
Mexico's Congress had the power to create an organ to combat employment
discrimination. Admittedly, there is conflict on this point. On the one hand
is Gil Rend6n's argument that, since the Commission is the constitutional body
on point per Article 102(b) and since the Commission is given rule-making and
judicial authority over human rights concerns, the legislature is powerless. Gil
118 Id. at 169.
"9 CONSTITUCION POLTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS art. 1.
120 Id. art. 102(b).
121 Although there is no engine for searching the Recomendaciones, glossing through the facts
of the first half of the published cases for 2004 and 2005 revealed not a single employment
discrimination claim. Recomendaciones, Comisi6n Nacional de los Derechos Humanos (an
informal posting of Recommendations from the reporter, Gaceta) (2005), available at http://
www.cndh.org.mx.
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Rend6n stresses that nothing in Article 73 specifically authorizes the Congress
to legislate on discrimination.
22
In response to Gil Rend6n, three Article 73 provisions can be cited. First,
Mexico's Congress is authorized "to create and eliminate federal public
employment positions, and designate, increase, or reduce personnel to those
positions."'23 This provision suggests that federal employment relationships
are within Congress' power to regulate; whether Congress choose to delegate
that power to another organ is its choice (as so opted in the case of
CONAPRED).
Second, the Congress may "define the crimes against the federation and set
the punishments that must be imposed for them."' 24 This provision might be
used if the national legislature decided to make employment discrimination a
crime against the federation. Admittedly, such rhetoric rings close to a threat
of treason, but if Congress defined employment discrimination as a crime
against the people, and thus against the state (as the embodiment of the
people), then perhaps the second provision could apply. 25
Third, the Congress may "make laws for the national planning of economic
and social development."' 26 This provision, combined with the first provision,
seems most convincing in arguing that Congress has a legitimate power of
legislation here. Especially in light of the legislative findings-as seen
through the dictdmenes (Congressional record)--that discrimination has
unnecessarily hindered meaningful employment for countless minority
members, it seems that Congress recognized that discrimination is against any
national plan for social development.'27 Consequently, CONAPRED and the
Mexican statute can be seen as the embodiment of that policy decision, as
made under Article 73(XXIX-D).
In conclusion, CONAPRED and the new Mexican law are consistent with
the constitutional goal of protecting against discrimination (not overstepping
the bounds of the National Commission on Human Rights) and are likely
122 Gil Rend6n, supra note 13, at 165-66.
123 CONSTITUCION POITICA DE LOS EsTADos UNIDOS MEXICANOS art. 73 cl. XI.
124 Id. art. 73 cl. XXI.
125 This argument seems more tenuous and may not be supported by constitutional
interpretations in Mexico. The above reading seems to fly in the face of the relatively clear
intent behind "crimes against the federation," however it is at least one possible source of
counter-argument.
126 Id. art. 73 cl. XXIX-D.
127 See Paredes Rangel, supra note 24; Aragon Castillo, supra note 36; Pellegrini Perez,
supra note 37.
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within the limits of Congressional action under Article 73(XI) and (XXIX-D).
Thus, of the three primary concerns among commentators, the new law seems
best able to respond to a challenge of unconstitutionality. Since
unconstitutionality would instantly terminate the benefits of the new law (at
least in pertinent part), this conclusion is the most favorable for any hope of
Mexico's compliance with the NAALC.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ley Federal para Prevenir y Eliminar la Discriminaci6n sets forth
ambitious proscriptions against discrimination, including discrimination in the
workplace. Employer decisions made on the basis of race, sex, age, disability,
social or economic condition, health condition, pregnancy, language, religion,
opinion or political persuasion, sexual preference, marital status, xenophobia,
anti-Semitism, or "any other distinction that has the effect of impeding or
annulling the recognition or exercise of rights and equal opportunities" are
prohibited. 2 ' The breadth of the statute is even broader than that of U.S.
law-either by Title VII, the adjoining statutes, or the case law interpreting
those statutes. 129 However, the breadth of the statute only ensures that a broad
range of individuals can be eligible plaintiffs under the statute. Enforcement
is one historic plague of employment rules in Mexico, 3° yet deeper textual and
constitutional concerns might hamper the expansive intent of the Mexican law
to the extent that it becomes meaningless in light of Mexico's treaty
obligations, such as those under the NAALC. Despite noted concern among
Mexico's legislators for fulfillment of treaty obligations regarding
discrimination,' issues as to the applicability of the statute to non-federal
employers, the existence and contours of group discrimination theories, and the
constitutionality of the law and its enforcement agency, CONAPRED, mire the
law in controversy surrounding its actual value and effect.
First, as to the range of defendants, Mexico's law may only cover federal
employers. Despite the fact that the legislature didn't specifically limit the
statute to federal employers, the language of the prohibitions focuses on
"public organs and federal authorities, within their jurisdiction." '32 The fact
128 Ley para Prevenir la Discriminaci6n art. 4.
129 For example, discrimination on the basis of sexual preference is not prohibited in the
United States. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
130 See generally McGuinness, supra note 34, at 4.
... See Paredes Rangal, supra note 24.
132 Ley para Prevenir la Discriminaci6n arts. 10-15.
[Vol. 34:657
2006] LEY FEDERAL PARA PREVENIR Y ELIMINAR LA DISGRIMINACION 685
that 10% of the total statute is devoted exclusively to government employers
strongly suggests a federal limit to the law. However, this issue indicts the
new statute, rather than wholeheartedly undermines it.
Second, as to the number of theories available to plaintiffs, group theories
of discrimination are not entirely available. Systemic disparate treatment
theory (by comparison to its contours and benefits in the United States) almost
assuredly does not exist under the Mexican statute. Further, any disparate
impact theory, although available to an individual plaintiff as a means of
escaping a requirement of discriminatory intent, seems unlikely to be available
to group plaintiffs. The unavailability of a theory of discrimination for a group
of plaintiffs means that, as previously noted, (1) costs of litigation will not be
spread, (2) the strength of the inference of actual discrimination will not be as
strong, (3) various types of evidence (such as statistics) will likely be less
relevant, (4) psychological barriers to suit (such as the risk of retaliation and
the fear of being alone in victimization) will not be alleviated, (5) the
unintentional discriminator will likely be less aware of her or his offense at an
early stage in the litigation, (6) larger employers will not have the benefit of
an efficient defense, and (7) plaintiffs will not have the full benefit of res
gestae (or any comparable approach) to show the extent of discrimination
against them.
Third, and most perilous for the continued existence of the Mexican statute,
its constitutionality has been made suspect. Although the law and
CONAPRED still exist,' the law seems to directly violate Article 102(b) of
Mexico's Constitution. Support for the law must be drawn from links to other
enumerated powers of the legislature under Article 73. In an interpretive
battle-despite the best intentions of Congress, the clear constitutional
mandate that the National Commission on Human Rights be given control over
the issue of human rights to the exclusion of other bodies might prevail.
However, of the three main challenges to the new law, Mexico at least has
viable defenses to the issue of unconstitutionality.
The final remaining issue is defining the consequences of these problems.
This raises three issues in itself. First, what degree of compliance with the
NAALC is required for Mexico to fulfill its treaty obligations? Second, what
degree of compliance will Mexico attain with its new law? Third, what impact
does non-compliance have on the other member nations?
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states the general rule of
compliance in international law: "every treaty in force is binding upon the
133 However, note that little (if any) litigation has yet transpired over this issue.
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parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith."' 13 4 Two separate
sub-issues are raised: (1) are Mexico and the United States both subject to the
rule articulated in the Vienna Convention, and (2) is the NAALC a treaty in
force between those parties?
As to whether both nations are subject to the Vienna Convention rule, it
should be observed that Mexico ratified the treaty September 25, 1974; the
treaty went into effect in Mexico on January 27, 1980.135 The United States,
on the other hand, signed the convention April 24, 1970, but has never ratified
or otherwise caused the treaty to take effect.' 36 However, this potential issue
is resolved since, under customary international law, the United States is
considered to have accepted various terms of the Vienna Convention.1 37 Thus,
most likely, Mexico must in good faith perform its obligation under the
NAALC.
The second issue is whether Mexico has indeed performed under the
NAALC in good faith. It is clear from the language of the Vienna Convention
that complete or perfect performance is not needed, so long as a nation's actual
performance is in good faith. Even discounting gaps in enforcement prior to
the new Mexican law, and disregarding potential issues as to the future funding
of CONAPRED, Mexico's anti-discrimination statute likely fails to constitute
good faith performance. To fulfill its promise under the Vienna Convention,
Mexico must in good faith "promote compliance with and effectively enforce
its labor law through appropriate government action."' 3
Since the supreme law of the land, the Constitution of Mexico, prohibits
discrimination,3 3 enforcement of the NAALC and the Vienna Convention
requirements effectively means that the anti-discrimination provisions of the
Constitution must be "effectively enforce[d]" in good faith. Where there are
gaps in that effective enforcement, Mexico's treaty obligations will remain
unmet. The first two attacks mounted against the Mexican statute (as to the
131 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
339.
131 Id. at 483.
136 Id.
' Robert F. Turner, US and UN: The Ties that Bind, Letter to the Editor, WALL ST. J., Dec.
1, 1997, at A23 ("[E]very single one of the... states that are members of the United Nations,
and every single one of the few states that are not, acknowledge(s)... Article 26.") (Professor
Turner is Associate Director of the Center for National Security Law at the University of
Virginia School of Law).
138 NAALC, supra note 5, art. 3(1).
39 CONSTITUCION POITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANO art. 1.
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scope of employers and as to the number of available theories) demonstrate
gaps in the enforcement of the law. First, if only federal employers are subject
to the new law, then the previous level of treaty performance as to private and
state employers would remain unchanged. Thus, Mexico would still not have
honored its duty. Second, if individuals may not group together to sue
discriminators, then, not only will they likely be deterred, 4 ' but they might
also be less likely to prevail.' 4 ' Since Mexico's statute tenuously applies to
Mexico's states and to private employers, and since the statute, likely, does not
have any group claim (even though an impact theory might be available to
individual plaintiffs), the Constitution's mandate against discrimination is
probably not substantially fulfilled.
The greatest risk comes with the argument on constitutionality. Whereas
the prior two attacks decrease the relative likelihood that Mexico will fulfill
its NAALC obligations, should the law prove unconstitutional, absolutely no
advance in satisfying NAALC obligations will have been made from the status
quo ante. In that scenario, Mexico is as much in violation now as it was prior
to the new statute. Since the argument that Congress has overreached its
constitutional power by trying to legislate where Article 102(b) expressly
provides that another organ is to have exclusive judicial and law-making
power, there is a risk that the law is unconstitutional. However, as a practical
matter, CONAPRED continues to exist and the law has not been deemed
unconstitutional. Thus, any benefits of the new law can be realized in
attempting to meet Mexico's NAALC obligations.
Finally, in addition to any moral quandary raised by failing to keep
international promises, Mexico also risks unfairly disadvantaging other
members of the NAALC. If, for example, older, disabled, or pregnant workers
receive benefits and accommodations in the United States, but not in Mexico,
then production can be accomplished at less cost in Mexico. All other factors
being equal, goods manufactured in Mexico could be sold more cheaply on the
market and manufacturers could pocket any price disparity as profit. While
corporations manufacturing in Mexico might benefit from any imbalance in
employment discrimination laws, manufacturers and laborers with operations
solely in the United States and Canada might face unfair competition as a
result of Mexico's failure to fulfill its NAALC obligations.
140 This deterrence includes both the psychological deterrents and the costs of litigation.
141 Decreased likelihood of success stems from, for example, the smaller pool of relevant
evidence, the weaker inference of discriminatory intent, and the inability to present res gestae
evidence.
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These conclusions have been made with primary dependence upon the text
of the new law and the body of the Constitution. The relative youth of the
statute, thus far, has meant little discussion on the merits and potency of
Mexico's statute. Even despite these methodological hurdles, the texts and
limited commentary do speak for themselves: Mexico's new law has serious
ailments as to its range of defendants and available theories of recovery. In
light of these conclusions and Mexico's pre-existing treaty obligations,
Mexico--via Ley Federalpara Preveniry Eliminar la Discriminaci6n-likely
falls short once again in fulfilling its obligations under the NAALC.
